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Group privacy is an interesting topic made more salient in recent years by the growth 
of big data, enabling people to be targeted and understood via their personal attributes 
(on the basis of correlations between the group of people who possess those attributes 
and  other  phenomena),  or  alternatively  via  the  properties  of  their  networks  (for 
instance, whether one is likely to default on a loan is correlated with one’s social 
network).  In  each  case,  the  dilemmas  of  privacy  are  thrown  into  sharp  relief  – 
visibility to one’s network brings benefits, but compromises privacy. Furthermore, 
there is a distinct potential for injustice, as one may find oneself discriminated against 
on the basis of behaviour of other people in one’s groups (Hildebrandt 2012). 
We should separate out the injustice from the privacy, but there is a prima facie case 
for arguing that we could nip the injustice in the bud if groups as well as individuals 
had privacy rights. In the age of big data, data crunchers are not interested in the 
individual data points, so much as the mass – yet the crunching of data about the mass 
can have real-world implications for individuals. 
One way of understanding this is to see it as one of the many ways in which data 
protection is an imperfect protection for privacy (O’Hara 2011, 7-11). Data protection 
requires an individual to be identifiable before data is classified as personal data so 
that it can only be processed with the subject’s consent (of course there are many 
exceptions  to  this  built  into  data  protection  legislation).  Yet  the  notion  of  group 
privacy is consistent with something that we intuitively understand in the age of spam 
and junk mail – one need not be identified to have one’s privacy invaded. The mere 
existence of a non-identifying profile of oneself, combined with a point of access such 
as an address, does not count as personal data, but is still an annoying invasion. 
Group privacy as derivative? 
However,  couching  the  problem  in  this  way  still  makes  the  privacy  of  the  group 
derivative  from  the  privacy  of  the  individual  –  the  individual’s  remedy  for  the 
invasion of his personal privacy is to insist on the privacy of a wider group of which 
he is an anonymous member. This seems to chime in with liberal ideas about privacy. 
The point of privacy, according to one influential analysis, is to support individual 
autonomy (Rössler 2005). Meanwhile, intrusion from the group itself has, since Mill, 
been  seen  as  an  serious  threat  to  the  individual  (Mill  1859).  And  a  number  of 
theorists, for example feminists, have tended to see the privacy of small units (from 
the family up) as a means of concealing abuse, rather than of legitimately supporting 
the individual (MacKinnon 1989, 168, Allen 2003). In a tradition that postulates the small group as the major threat to the individual, 
group  privacy  does  not  look  like  a  serious  runner,  unless  the  group  can  be 
reconceptualised  as  an  important  support  for  the  individual’s  autonomy  –  and  so 
group privacy seems to derive its value from the needs of the individual, not the group 
itself. 
Groups for social control 
On the other hand, a conservative viewpoint is more ambivalent about the power and 
potential of an individual – for instance, Burke lauds the little platoons, and considers 
the individual as intrinsically unable to make consistent or wise moral judgments. 
Schoeman argues, contra Mill, that social control, far from being morally destructive, 
is an important factor in a valuable liberty. Our competence as rational agents depends 
on  constructive  adaptations  of  social  control  mechanisms  in  real-world  contexts. 
Unpicking  informal  social  control  mechanisms  in  the  name  of  autonomy,  in 
Schoeman’s view, actually deprives the individual of important social abilities, and 
“helps maintain both the integrity of intimate spheres as against more public spheres 
and the integrity of various public spheres in relation to one another”  (Schoeman 
1992, 157). 
Adam  Smith’s  view,  with  regard  to  the  moral  education  of  people  in  the  newly 
emerging metropolises of the eighteenth century, is an interesting example of this kind 
of thought. 
A man of low  condition, on the  contrary, is  far from being a distinguished 
member of any great society. While he remains in a country village his conduct 
may  be  attended  to,  and  he  may  be  obliged  to  attend  to  it  himself.  In  this 
situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to 
lose. But as soon as he comes into the great city, he is sunk in obscurity and 
darkness.  His  conduct  is  observed  and  attended  to  by  nobody,  and  he  is 
therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort 
of profligacy and vice. (Smith 1994, vol.2, V.i.g.12, 795, footnote omitted) 
The way to address this, thought Smith, was not more policing or the reduction of the 
private sphere of the ‘man of low condition’, but rather greater power for groups, 
specifically those that have an interest in the individual’s moral conduct. 
He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excited 
so much the attention of any respectable society, as his becoming the member of 
a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration 
which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the 
sect, interested to observe his conduct, and if he gives occasion to any scandal, 
if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always 
require  of  one  another,  to  punish  him  by  what  is  always  a  very  severe 
punishment,  even  where  no  civil  effects  attend  it,  expulsion  or 
excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals 
of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; 
generally much more so than in  the established church.  (Smith  1994, vol.2, 
V.i.g.12, 795-6). Complexity 
As we consider these issues in the age of big data, it is worth addressing the issue of 
whether group privacy will create greater complexity in policing and vigilance, and 
whether a right will be created which would go beyond existing expectations and 
preferences, and the needs of democratic societies. Individual privacy introduces a 
number of private spaces proportional (of course) to the number of citizens, whereas 
group privacy will be a correspondingly complex concept to enforce. 
When we consider group privacy, if we think about the number of groups that people 
are willing to admit they are members of, and whose corporate privacy they wish to 
defend, the extra complexity probably grows in a linear fashion as population grows. 
On average, people might admit to membership of m groups (maybe m would be 
something between 10 and 100), while average membership of a group would be n 
people. Hence, for a population of x, the number of groups to be protected would be 
proportional to mx/n. 
However, big data will change this. The point of big data is that data mining finds 
significance in correlations within groups that have no external significance – one 
might easily not know, or care, that one was a member of such a group (like, for 
instance, 26-35 year old males earning between £40k-£50k p.a. in households without 
children  who  have  downloaded  more  than  5  unsolicited  recommendations  from 
iTunes in the last six months). Of course, for a population of x, the number of such 
potential groups is 2
x – 1, but as big data crunchers do not consider the coherence or 
independent interest of such groups, it would be hard to single out which groups are 
worth protecting. This could create an extremely complex and difficult legal scene, 
with hard decisions to make about liability and the balance between social good and 
protection of rights. 
So  it  is  likely  to  be  impractical  to  consider  theoretically  possible  groups,  whose 
number will grow exponentially with the population. The monitoring and policing of 
group privacy can more easily be kept tractable if we take into account those groups 
that individuals expressly understand themselves to be members of. In that sense, 
group privacy will remain derivative from individual privacy, but crucially in this case 
the value of the group’s privacy is decoupled from the individual’s privacy. In the 
conservative view of the world developed by Smith, the group’s interests may actually 
precede those of the individual. 
For example, consider what Nancy Rosenblum has termed the ‘logic of congruence’. 
Participation  in  groups  helps  cultivate  certain  values  and  virtues  in  the  members. 
Which ones are cultivated depends somewhat on the nature of the group in question. 
Membership tends to create individuals who are predisposed to internalise, uphold 
and perpetuate the values and virtues of that environment. Smith believed that this 
was inherently valuable. 
Given  that  view,  it  may  make  sense  to  look  at  group  privacy  as  a  means  of 
empowering the group to achieve its aims, and to see its protection as a means of 
institutionalising  that  empowerment.  Of  course  this  does  not  resolve  the  ethical 
question of when that is a good thing and when bad, but at least it gives us a rationale 
to  do  it.  The  final  question  I  will  consider  in  this  paper  is  whether  current 
conceptualisations of technology give us a handle on group empowerment. With that 
in mind, it may be worth exploring research into social machines. Social machines 
The world of big data has not, of course, been unaccompanied by other developments. 
In particular, as the amount of data that it is feasible to process has grown, so has the 
number of people that it is feasible to connect within a network. Figure 1, following 
David De Roure, gives a sense of different interaction modes of computing. Wherever 
there are more machines, to produce the big data paradigm at upper left, or more 
people, as in the social networking paradigm at lower right, distribution is inevitable, 
and hence Web or Web-like technologies are necessary to handle interaction at scale. 
The technological affordances have, over time, moved upward and toward the right, 
ultimately to reach the fourth quadrant. 
 
Figure 1: A matrix showing the affordances of scale (adapted from De Roure 2013) 
This  fourth  quadrant  is  termed  ‘social  machines’  (Berners-Lee  1999,  Hendler  & 
Berners-Lee 2010, Shadbolt et al 2013, O’Hara et al 2013), which are a nascent focus 
of computing research (Bernstein et al 2012). ‘Programming the global computer’ or 
‘global  ubiquitous  computing’  has  been  recognised  as  a  grand  challenge  for 
computing (Kwiatkowska et al 2004), while peer-to-peer technologies flexibly link 
people and computers, as explored in projects such as SOCIAM (http://sociam.org/), 
OpenKnowledge  (http://www.openk.org/)  and  the  Social  Computer  community 
(http://www.socialcomputer.eu/). As we unravel the mysteries of scale and control, 
we will need not just to understand the emergent phenomena, but to develop means, 
methods and tools for controlling large-scale phenomena, at least partially (O’Hara et 
al 2013). The problem is sharpened by the desideratum that ‘programming the social 
computer’ must be achievable from within the social computer – research here should 
democratise control by allowing people to develop social machines to achieve their 
own smaller-scale, local, idiosyncratic purposes. 
If we unpack that image as Figure 2, we see the potential space for advancement in 
more detail. We see conventional computation, even highly complex domains such as 
air  traffic  control  and  climate  modelling,  on  the  left  hand  side,  where  social 
complexity is low even if computational complexity is high. Current systems with high  social  complexity  still  involve  relatively  low  computational  complexity. 
Crowdsourcing systems, such as the citizen science initiative Galaxy Zoo (Lintott et al 
2008) have a relatively low level of social complexity as well. More complex social 
arrangements can be found in the co-creation of content, e.g. Wikipedia, and social 
networking. However, greater complexity can be found, for example, when social 
network  acts  as  platforms  for  crowdsourced  co-creation  of  content,  as  recently 
happened with the Ushahidi map of election violence in Kenya in 2007 (Okolloh 
2009), or the reuse of Ushahidi software to create a post-earthquake map of Port-au-
Prince in  Haiti  in  2010 (Morrow  et  al  2011).  As we  explore this  space of social 
computation, to address perceived issues where there are collective action problems, 
as with public health, transport or crime, we would expect to find solutions with small 
impacts  locally  which  will  be  magnified  at  scale,  as  long  as  the  requisite  social 
infrastructure (including Web technologies) is in place. 
 
Figure 2: The space of social machines (O’Hara et al 2013) 
The idea of a social machine has been implicit throughout the history of the Web. As 
Berners-Lee put it in 1999: 
Real life is and must be full of all kinds of social constraint – the very processes 
from which society arises. Computers can help if we use them to create abstract 
social machines on the Web: processes in which people do the creative work 
and  the  machine  does  the  administration.  (Berners-Lee  1999,  172,  Berners-
Lee’s emphasis) 
Many  social  machines  are  built  on  SNSs  such  as  Facebook,  in  which  human 
interactions  from  organising  a  birthday  party  to  interacting  with  a  Member  of 
Parliament are underpinned by the engineered environment. Another type of example 
is  a  multiplayer  online  game,  where  a  persistent  online  environment  facilitates 
interactions  concerning  virtual  resources  between  real  people.  A  third  type  is  an online poker game, where the resources being played for are real-world, where the 
players may be human or bots, and where the environment in which the game takes 
place is engineered around a relatively simple computational model. In such systems, 
(some of) the social constraints that Berners-Lee talks about, currently norm-driven, 
are administered by the architecture of the programmed environment. 
A  generalised  definition  of  a  social  computation  is  provided  by  (Robertson  and 
Giunchiglia 2013): 
A computation for which an executable specification exists but the successful 
implementation of this specification depends upon computer mediated social 
interaction between the human actors in its implementation. 
In  such  an  environment,  self-organisation  (partial  or  full)  becomes  viable  and 
scalable, while physical objects, agents, contracts, agreements, incentives and other 
objects can be referred to using URIs. ‘Programming’ the social computer (as opposed 
to simply supporting and directing interactions on an engineered environment) and 
integrating larger numbers of people and machines will become increasingly feasible. 
As a small example of a social machine, consider reCAPTCHA (Von Ahn et al 2008). 
A  CAPTCHA  (Completely  Automated  Public  Turing  test  to  tell  Computers  and 
Humans Apart), invented by Louis Von Ahn, is the distorted sequence of letters that 
someone has to type in a box to identify him- or herself as a human (e.g. to buy a 
ticket online, or to comment on a blog). This is a task that computers cannot do, and 
so the system stops bots buying thousands of tickets for a concert or sporting event for 
later resale, or for a spambot to leave spam messages as comments to blogs (Von Ahn 
et al 2003). 
Von Ahn  extended the  idea of the CAPTCHA  to  create the reCAPTCHA, which 
socialises  the  same  principle  to  solve  another  problem.  Google  (which  acquired 
reCAPTCHA  in  2009)  uses  it  to  scan  older  books  automatically.  The  original 
CAPTCHA  device  was  being  used  over  200m  times  a  day,  about  half  a  million 
person-hours of effort. reCAPTCHA puts these person-hours to more productive use, 
presenting the user who wishes to identify him- or herself as a human with two words, 
not one. The first is a normal CAPTCHA, and the second is a word from an old book 
that Optical Character Recognition had failed to identify. If the person succeeds with 
the first CAPTCHA, then he or she is known to be a human. As humans are reliable at 
word recognition, the response to the second word as a plausible suggestion of what it 
is. Presenting the same word to multiple users allows a consensus to emerge. The goal 
of the social machine is to digitise books – people’s needs to prove themselves human 
provides the mechanism. 
However,  reCAPTCHA  is  purely  exploitative,  as  the  goal  of  the  machine  is 
independent  of the requirements  of its  human ‘components’.  As another example, 
(Robertson  and  Giunchiglia  2013)  use  the  DARPA  balloon  challenge  of  2009,  in 
which the aim was to find ten weather balloons placed randomly around the US (in 
nine different states from California to Delaware). The rules of the challenge were 
intended  to  support  the  growth  of  a  network  of  people  taking  part  in  the  search, 
enabling a crowdsourced solution. The means of doing this in the winning solution 
(from Sandy Pentland at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was to set out 
financial incentives  according to  a Query  Incentive Network Model  (Kleinberg & 
Raghavan 2005), in which people were incentivised both to look for the balloons and 
to add more people to the network. Pentland’s team began with 4 people, and using social media had recruited over 5,000 at the point of completion, which took under ten 
hours (Pickard et al 2010). 
reCAPTCHA and the DARPA challenge were designed to solve a particular problem, 
but social machines can, and indeed should (O’Hara 2012), solve the problems of the 
people who constitute them. In such cases, the incentive of the participants is that the 
machine’s  smooth  functioning  is  in  their  own  interests.  One  could  imagine,  for 
instance, a set of computer-mediated interactions enabling a community to provide a 
social response to problems of crime (such as BlueServo, http://www.blueservo.net/, 
which  crowdsources  the  policing  of  the  Texas-Mexico  border),  or  enabling  those 
suffering from a particular health care problem to pool resources and to offer support 
and advice to fellow sufferers (such as curetogether.com, http://curetogether.com/). 
There is a growing number of health social machines, as surveyed in detail in (Van 
Kleek et al 2013). It will be obvious from these examples, particularly BlueServo, that 
such  efforts  will  not  always  be  uncontroversial.  Attempts  to  crowdsource  the 
identities of the bombers of the Boston Marathon in 2013 bordered on farce, and, 
although the countercultural website 4chan was prominent in the home-made policing 
efforts  with  its  so-called  ‘4chan  Think  Tank’,  its  lamentable  efforts  were  soon 
parodied elsewhere on the same site (Walker 2013). Trust will be a major factor in the 
success of such machines (O’Hara 2012). 
Social machines as a way to approach group privacy 
Suppose methods and tools were available to enable and empower communities to use 
data and networked communications to solve self-identified problems. In that event, 
the social machine would have certain functional requirements. The ‘program’ for the 
machine – i.e. the computations that it would carry out to transform the state of the 
world – can be written down in abstract terms, independent of whether the computing 
was being done by machines, people or groups of people. 
Such an abstract specification will need to be ‘filled in’ by accounts of other key 
factors for the machine to function – for instance, the decisions by actors to engage 
with the machine, the knowledge that actors bring to the computation, the ontology of 
annotations for the interactions which render them understandable, data management 
methods, the incentives to participate, the restrictions on who can participate and so 
on. 
One of the issues alluded to above is the actors’ trust of the system, which will include 
their  needs  for  privacy.  Modelling  a  sociotechnical  interaction  in  this  way  might 
enable  the  privacy  requirements  of  participants  to  be  specified.  For  instance,  one 
might say that a particular computation n(S1,S2), which transforms the world from 
state S1 to state S2 would only be possible if the actor(s) involved, who carry out n, 
can freely exchange personal data with each other, while ensuring that it does not 
spread beyond their circle. Or it might be that the actors require access to the personal 
data of all participants in the social machine (including of those not involved in that 
particular computational step). Or it might be that external services might be required 
which need access to personal data, or anonymised personal data, of participants in 
the social machine. 
A statement in terms of the information-processing needs of the social machine would 
help make the demands made on information about the group as a whole explicit in 
terms of the goals which it wishes to achieve. In that way, we might find ways of 
explaining the functional value of privacy for a particular group, independently of moral  generalisations  about  group  privacy  rights  –  though  not,  of  course, 
independently of the moral question of whether a group should be empowered to 
achieve its particular goals. 
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